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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  reviews the role of national administered protection agencies, whose 
responsibility is the enforcement of  national trade remedy laws.  After reviewing  four 
recent trade  remedy  cases we argue that the role of the  national administered  protection 
agencies should  be  changed.  Given  the  additional  responsibilities the  wro  has 
assumed  in  administering  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture,  the  growth  of regional 
integration agreements and the increasing  use  of anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
actions against  fairly traded  imports, we argue that all trade actions  should  be taken  to 
the wro for settlement.  The role of the national administered protection agencies should 
be changed  to  make them  agents  for trade liberalization.  This would  involve  them 
taking  on three primary functions: 1) as transparency agents;  2)  as  investigatory agents; 
and  3)  as  advocacy agents. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
National  trade  remedy  laws  have  a  long,  although  perhaps  not a  particularly 
honourable history.  Laws to govern "unfair" trading practices were put into place in the 
United States, early in the twentieth century, to deal with predatory pricing by foreign firms 
(anti-dumping law) and government subsidized foreign competition (countervailing duty 
law).  In addition, the United States has trade remedy laws to protect domestic industries 
from  fairly  traded  imports  (Section  201  - Escape  Clause  of the  Trade Act of 1974). 
National administered protection agencies (NAPAs) are charged with the application of 
these laws and they are the primary focus of this paper. 
Internationally, the rules governing anti-dumping (AD) and  countervailing duties 
(CVD) have been a continuous source of controversy in the GATT.  The United States has 
generally taken a position in favour of more stringent (more protectionist) AD/CVD laws, 
while many other countries view these laws as simply a way to harass and impede imports. 
The GATT (1947) allowed for AD/CVD laws through Articles VI and XVI.  While Article VI 
required an  injury test - United States countervailing duty law,  in  1947, did not and this 
departure from GATT rules was grandfathered into the Agreement.  In accepting the Tokyo 
Round Subsidies Code, the United States agreed to an injury test for countervailing duty 
cases relating to dutiable imports(CBO).  Significant changes were made in AD/CVD law 
as a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
1
•  Schott argues that the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on countervailing duties represents considerable progress while the new 
1Schott discusses these changes but for CVD investigations they include: 1) specific time schedules 
for decisions, 2) a higher de minimus level, 3) a five year sunset provision, 4) the opportunity for consumers 
of the foreign product to make representations, 5) different rules for developing nations, and 6) an appeals 
process.  Most importantly,  however,  INfO panel  reports  cannot be  blocked  from  adoption  except by 
consensus.  The INfO rules governing AD and CVD actions are not self-executing, hence these procedures 
must be incorporated into domestic legislation and applied by  national administered protection agencies like 
the USITC. 3 
rules on anti-dumping are a disappointment.
2 
National administered protection agencies not only take AD/CVD actions against the 
unfair trading practices of foreign exporters, but these agencies also provide input into the 
proceedings of other forms of trade remedy measures.  The USITC has recently carried 
out Section 332 investigations of  the Canadian beef cattle and durum whe~t  industries and 
it provided economic analysis of the U.S.  Section 22  investigation of Canadian durum 
wheat exports. 
Other papers in this conference provide an evaluation of United States anti-dumping 
law and the procedures followed by the United States International Trade Commission 
(USITC)  in  evaluating these cases (Wolak;  Jabara).  The focus of our attention  is  on 
countervailing duty law.  Following  a brief background  statement we proceed  1)  to 
evaluate countervailing duty laws from an economic perspective; 2) to provide a synopsis 
and  commentary  on  the  economic analysis  undertaken  in  four recent trade disputes 
between the United States and Canada; and 3) to provide some suggestions for changing 
the  dispute  settlement  role  of  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  and  national 
administered protection agencies. 
BACKGROUND 
It is  instructive to begin by asking  if AD/CVD laws are important in  international 
commerce?  There are some facts which would suggest that they are not.  First, although 
40 countries have AD/CVD laws, only a few countries are heavy users; namely, the United 
States, Canada, European Union and Australia.  These laws are used only rarely by other 
developed countries and almost never by developing countries.  Second, in agriculture 
they are seldom applied to the imports of major commodities, finding their most heavy use, 
in  the  U.S.,  against  products  like  cut  flowers,  red  raspberries,  kiwi  fruit  and  fresh 
asparagus.  Third, of the 1,112 AD/CVD cases filed in the United States between 1980 and 
2  There are several excellent surveys of these issues available in the literature (CSO, USITC (1995), 
Schott). 4 
1992 only 34.2% ended with affirmative outcomes and final duties being applied (DeVault). 
Fourth, in only one year (1982) did the subject imports account for more than 1  % of total 
United States imports (USITC, 1995).  Hence, based on this evidence one might argue that 
AD/CVD laws are of little consequence tG anyone other than trade lawyers and of no real 
consequence to international commerce. 
This would be an  erroneous perception.  Although only 34.2% of United States 
AD/CVD cases ended in final affirmative duties, DeVault calculates that fewer than 25% 
result in  negative outcomes.  The remainder of the cases  involved the  application  of 
provisional duties or were concluded with  price agreements and/or voluntary restraint 
agreements.  All  of these  actions  involve  import harassment and  import protection.
3 
Second, the increasing use of AD/CVD laws in major industrial countries is a reflection of 
their advanced legal systems, and the sophistication of  their rent-seeking producer groups. 
This  is  not an  activity we  necessarily want emulated  in  the developing world.  Third, 
AD/CVDs  have typically been  used  to  impede the  exports of developing  nations,  for 
example, the United States has brought  fourteen separate cases against Colombia's cut 
flower industry(CBO).  Fourth, there has been a substantial increase in the average duty 
applied to "unfair" imports by the United States.  Between 1980-1986, the average duty 
was 21.6%, by 1987-1992 the average duty had increased to 47.2% (DeVault). 
The evolution of United States AD/CVD law has almost eliminated the use of the 
Section 201  Escape Clause.  There is little need for an industry to complain about fairly 
traded imports, only to receive temporary protection, when the standard of injury is lower 
for unfairly traded imports.  With a finding that imports are unfairly traded, protection has 
historically been permanent, and unfairness can almost always be found.  Even the U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office (p. 51) notes:  "Proving dumping or subsidies is not much of 
a hurdle, ... , since Department of Commerce's procedures find dumping or subsidies in the 
vast majority of cases."  The stringency of anti-dumping law has led Canada's Minister for 
3  It is generally accepted that simply bringing a AD/CVD case results in  import harassment.  The 
uncertainty surrounding the possibility of a trade action results in caution being exercised by foreign exporters, 
especially considering the cost of defending themselves, even when successful. 5 
International Trade, Roy Maclaren, to suggest the "necessity of considerably tightening 
the international discipline on - if not the outright dismantling - of anti-dumping law."  While 
the weakness of the Uruguay Round AD agreement has led Schott (p.  85) to state "the 
agreement provides a bandage to a festering sore of trade policy." 
If AD/CVD laws are often used as a protective device, what are the economic 
principles underlying their application?  Anti-dumping laws were originally put in place to 
prevent predatory pricing.  Predatory pricing is the practice of a firm selling products below 
cost to  drive out rival  firms,  thereby creating  a  monopoly for itself and  enabling  it to 
subsequently raise prices above those that prevailed before the predatory pricing began. 
This form of firm behaviour stifles competition and is welfare decreasing.  However, there 
is a general consensus that successful predatory pricing is extremely rare.  Shin, in her 
study of 282 anti-dumping cases, could find only 10% that were consistent with dumping 
behaviour.  Some might argue that this  behaviour reflects the "new trade theory" but even 
Krugman argues that such behaviour is rare in the real world.  The probability of a firm 
creating a monopoly in  the production of an  agricultural good, unless it is government 
sanctioned  through  a  domestic  marketing  board  or marketing  order,  seems  remote. 
Whatever its original intent, AD laws are now used primarily against international price 
discrimination, selling in  a foreign market for less than in the home market.  Behaviour, 
which if practised by domestic firms in the domestic market is perfectly legal. 
In this paper, we will concentrate primarily on CVD actions.  The economic basis for 
. a CVD complaint is different than for an AD action.  An anti-dumping action is brought by 
domestic producers against foreign firms who are alleged to be engaging in unfair pricing 
practices.  A countervailing duty case is brought by domestic producers against foreign 
governments.  As Horlick (p.  137) notes, there is "a grain of truth, which is the distortion 
caused by subsidies" lying behind the rational for a CVD, while AD actions are "90 percent 
pure protectionist".  Essentially, domestic firms should not be expected to compete against 
the treasuries of foreign governments, or to use an overworked cliche the "playing field 6 
should be level".4 
The welfare effects of AD/CVD laws on the country imposing these duties are 
familiar to anyone with a passing acquaintance of welfare economics.  Since the country 
imposing the AD/CVD is an importer, the duty acts like a tariff and will  lower the economic 
welfare of the country imposing the duty. 
5  Welfare is lowered because expensive home 
country production or "fairly" traded imports are substituted, for "unfairly" traded ones.
6 
This is a "beggar your consumer" policy.  It should be noted that from a  welfare economics 
perspective  it makes no difference if the "low" prices result from the actions of  foreign firms 
or foreign governments.  If someone offers to sell you butter for one-quarter of  what it costs 
to produce butter at home, there is only one economically correct answer.  Thank you very 
much! 
The USITC in a comprehensive analysis of the economic effects of  AD/CVD actions 
in the United States calculated a net welfare loss of $1.59 billion and job losses of 4,075 
in  the  affected  sectors  (USITC,  1995).  This  amounts to  about $39,000  per worker 
transferred from employment in the affected sector to alternative employment elsewhere 
in the economy.7  However, these calculations were sufficiently troublesome to have two 
of the six USITC commissioners vote against the release of the USITC study. 
Commissioner Newquist noted,  "the estimates provided  here are not "facts"  or 
"findings" in  the usual sense of Commission 332  studies; instead they are theoretical, 
untested results of  certain modelling exercises undertaken by Commission economists and 
should be viewed with that understanding and limitation." 
The dissenting Commissioners, as well as two others who had serious reservations 
4 A former Commissioner of the USITC once noted that countries should be concemed less about the 
tilt of the playing field and more about the quality of the team they put on the field. 
5 The exception is when the importing country is"large" and the duty approximates an optimal tariff. 
6 There is considerable evidence of trade diversion from unfairly to fairly traded imports as a result 
of AD/CVD actions in the United States (US  lTC, 1995). 
7 The CGE model employed by the USITC assumes full employment (USITC, 1995). 7 
about the report, seemed to base their negative opinions on two assumptions.  First, the 
results of the computable general equilibrium model used by the USITC can not capture 
the "localized" negative effects on the affected industries; and second, a political decision 
has been taken to discourage unfairly traded imports, regardless of their benefits, if they 
cause harm to competing domestic industries and workers.  These views are consistent 
with  Corden's description of a conservative welfare function  and  more flattering  than 
Baldwin and Steagall's assertion that "in recent years President's have tended to nominate 
and Senate to confirm, individuals who do not apply strict injury or causation standards." 
AD/CVD laws apply both to manufactured and agricultural products.  In practice, 
these laws are designed to deal primarily with "fix price" markets rather than the "flex price" 
markets that generally characterize trade in agricultural commodities.  This has implications 
particularly with  regard  to  price  under-cutting.  Further,  the  Uruguay Round  of trade 
negotiations continues the tradition of agricultural products being treated differently within 
the GATTIWTO than are manufactured products.  This is an important point to which we 
will return. 
Whatever the merits of countervailing duties on  welfare grounds they deal with 
questions with which economists are comfortable.  What are the effects of subsidies or 
pricing practices on the volume of trade, production, prices and industry welfare?  Hence, 
it is instructive to compare the administrative procedures followed in CVD cases to what 
we teach our students in  Economics 101.  The time constraints national administered 
protection agencies work under, and the requirement in the U.S. to examine an exhaustive 
set of economic indicators often means that these agencies are attempting to apply basic 
economic principles to complex real world situations.  Seldom will national administered 
protection agencies have the lUXUry of estimating crucial economic parameters, testing 
theory or applying the latest theoretical or econometric techniques. In addition, the task of 
obscuring the basics, in AD/CVD cases, is generally well managed by  the economists 
employed by the defendants and the complainants in any particular case. 
The GATT (1994) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures specifies 
a three step process for determining if a country may legally impose a countervailing duty 8 
on the exports of another country: 
Standing: Are the complainants representative of the domestic industry that produces the 
subject  product?  In  making  this  determination,  the  Agreement  on  Subsidies  and 
Countervailing Measures states that an application can be considered to have been made 
on behalf of  the domestic industry if it is supported by domestic producers whose collective 
output constitutes  more  than  50%  of the total  production  of the  like-product and  no 
investigation should be undertaken if the petition is supported by less than 25% of total 
like-product production. 
Subsidy: Does a domestic or export subsidy exist in  a foreign nation which influences 
domestic imports?  GATT (1994) provides an illustrative list of export subsidies, a definition 
of  non-actionable general (non-specific) subsidies and a short list of non-actionable specific 
subsidies.  GATT (1994) also specifies a de minimus level for actionable subsidies of 1% 
ad valorem in countervailing duty cases. In addition, the Agreement on Agriculture contains 
a number of exceptions which apply to agriculture. 
Injury/Causality:  Is  the  complainant's  industry  materially  injured  or threatened  with 
material injury as a result of the subsidized imports and, not by other factors which could 
be harming the industry?  On this point, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures is  quite specific.  It says that "it must be  demonstrated that the subsidized_ 
imports  are,  through  the  effects  of  subsidies,  causing  injury".  In  addition,  "the 
demonstration of a causal relationship between the subsidized imports and the injury shall 
be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities - other factors 
(affecting the industry) should not be ascribed to the imports." 
These three steps  in  evaluating the domestic effects of subsidized  imports are 
generally consistent with  the  principles  of economic policy  evaluation.  The  rules  on 
standing are designed to reduce frivolous complaints, although they are not sufficiently 
stringent to keep Canada's single producer of padded, perfumed ladies coat hangers from 
alleging injury resulting from imports of foreign like-products. 
The calculation of the level of the subsidy is  more problematic, but many of the 
subsidies provided to agricultural producers are fairly transparent.  There will always be 9 
disagreements about specificity and measurement techniques but the existence and value 
of particular subsidies is less controversial than the injury determination.
8 
The GATT (1994) allows for countervailing duties to be applied in the case of either 
foreign export subsidies or domestic subsidies, even though export subsidies are expressly 
prohibited on manufactured goods.  The prohibition presumably reflects the more trade 
distorting impact of export subsidies, but  given the way CVO's are normally calculated, 
domestic subsidies are treated more harshly. 
It is instructive to consider first the trade effects of export subsidies as illustrated in 
Figure 1.  Panel (a) in Figure 1 denotes the foreign country, panel © the home country and 
panel (b) the excess supply and excess demand curves whose intersection determines the 
free trade world market price of Pw. At this price the foreign country consumes 0 Fsupplies 
SF and the home country supplies SH and demands 0H'  The world trade volume is E, as 
illustrated in  panel (b).  The effect of a constant per unit export subsidy in the foreign 
country is to shift the excess supply function from ESF  to ES'F'  This results in the world 
price declining from Pw to PH and the domestic price in the foreign country increasing from 
Pw to PF . The quantity traded increases from E to E'.  Clearly, foreign producers and home 
country consumers gain as a result of the export subsidy, while foreign consumers and 
domestic producers lose as a result of the export subsidy.  If a countervailing duty equal 
to PF-PH  is levied on imports it shifts the excess supply curve from ES'F back to its original 
position ESF.  In effect, the countervailing duty exactly offsets the export subsidy so the 
free  trade  equilibrium  price  Pw, and  the free  trade 'equilibrium  quantity traded  (E)  is 
restored. 
Consider now Figure 2, which illustrates the effects of a domestic subsidy.  In panel 
(a) the competitive supply curve SF is shifted to the left, to S'F. as a result of either an input 
subsidy or an output subsidy.  This results in the excess supply curve shifting from ESF  to 
ES'F'  World prices decline from Pwto P' win both the importing and exporting regions.  The 
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quantity traded increases from E to E.  If the home country imposes a countervailing duty 
equal to the per unit domestic subsidy (a-c) the new excess supply function will be shifted 
to the left of the competitive excess supply function (ESF)  resulting in higher world market 
prices and lower world trade volumes than in the free trade situation.  The degree of the 
overestimation depends on the elasticity of the excess supply and excess demand curves. 
Only when the excess demand curve has an infinite elasticity would the countervailing duty 
be calculated correctly.  However, in this case the foreign nation is a "small country" and 
its exports would have no effect on price in the home market and result in  no material 
injury.  The GATI rules  clearly  anticipate  this  potential  situation  when  they  discuss 
remedies for domestic subsidies. 
Remedy: If an investigation uncovers subsidies above the de minim us level and material 
injury has occurred, the wro allows a countervailing duty to be applied to the subsidized 
imports.  The WTO allows the countervailing duty to be up to the level of the measured 
subsidy, and it goes on to say that "it is desirable that the duty should be less than the total 
amount of the subsidy if such  lesser duty would  be adequate to  remove  injury to the 
domestic industry."  While calculating the proper level for the countervailing duty in the 
case of a domestic subsidy is more complicated than in the case of an export subsidy,  ~ 
because  it  relies  on  economic  parameters  (supply  and  demand  elasticities),  these 
parameters are often needed to determine injury.  Hence, this information could be used 
in selecting a more proper remedy.9 
In  addition to the WTO rules  and  simple  analytics discussed  above,  there are 
several key decisions that must be taken in  every countervailing duty investigation that 
influence the potential for an adverse ruling.  These decisions are a part of the standing 
determination but go well beyond the legal issue of who has the right to bring a case. 
Article  11.4 of the Agreement on  Subsidies and  Countervailing  Measures says 
9  This discussion assumes that the proper role  of a CVD is to  restore the competitive 
solution.  An  alternative explanation  is  that the  CVD  is  simply the  agreed  upon  penalty for a 
government which subsidizes production and it has nothing to do with the competitive solution. 
Under this viewpoint subsidizing countries have agreed to be over-penalized for their activities. 11 
domestic producers have the legal right to bring a countervailing duty case if they produce 
a product "like" the one subsidized by the foreign government.  The term "like-product" is 
not defined leaving this decision up to the complainant and national authorities to decide. 
In general, the complainant will have an incentive to reduce the size of the allegedly injured 
domestic industry.  In this way, the effects of  the subsidized imports are more concentrated 
making it easier to find  injury.  An example cited by the Congressional Budget Office 
relates to the CVD cases against cut flowers.  When the industry was defined as cut 
flowers as a whole, or for broad segments of the flower industry, the USITC usually found 
no injury, but when the industry was defined for specific flowers injury was found. 
A second key decision relates to the issue of  whether the foreign subsidized product 
is similar to,  or identical to the domestic product.  Economists would tackle this question 
through the use of elasticities of substitution in final consumption for a consumption good, 
or production for an input.  An infinite elasticity of substitution would imply homogeneous 
goods, while an  elasticity of substitution greater than zero but less than infinity would 
signify differentiated products.  An elasticity of substitution equal to zero would indicate that 
the goods are used in fixed proportions.  In general, the complainant will argue that the 
imported goods are identical to the domestic good, while the defendant will argue that the 
imported  product is  differentiated.  If no injury is found  using the homogeneous good 
assumption it seems highly unlikely that injury could be proven if the goods are considered 
differentiated products.  However, injury might be found for homogenous goods but not for 
differentiated products, hence the importance of the decision. 
Finally, some agrifood products are traded in more than one form and at multiple 
levels of the market.  This fact raises the issue of "upstream" subsidies.  An  upstream 
subsidy investigation requires two steps.  The first step is to document the government 
programs that provide subsidies and to determine at which market level they most logically 
apply.  The second step is to analyze the potential for the subsidies to injure the domestic 
industries at both market levels.  An example will help to illustrate the pOint. 
Suppose a price support scheme for raw product producers in country 1 results in 
increased production of the raw product in that country, and a lower market price for the 12 
raw product in both countries.  In this case, subsidies in country 1 injure the raw product 
producers in country 2, but  the raw product subsidy does not injure the processing sector 
in country 2.  The processing sectors in both countries gain access to a lower priced input, 
and both sell their output for the same price.  Therefore, the processing sectors in both 
countries benefit while raw product producers in country 2 are injured and raw product 
producers in country 1 benefit. 
Now suppose that country 1 provides an energy subsidy to its processors.  Lower 
fuel costs allow processors in country 1 to bid up the price of other inputs including the raw 
product.  This causes injury to country 2's processing sector and benefits raw product 
producers in both countries.  Finally, suppose country 1 offers a subsidy on every unit of 
raw product purchased from domestic sources.  In the long run, this scheme increases the 
supply of  the raw product in country 1 and the raw product price in both countries declines. 
Therefore, raw product producers and processors in country 2 would be injured. 
The variety of possible scenarios suggests that it is crucial to evaluate the potential 
effects of the existing subsidies on the various market participants before defining the 
domestic industry. 
While the economic analysis of various stylized subsidy schemes is straight forward, 
"real world" CVD cases are messy.  Seldom will the facts fit neatly into a textbook example. 
For that reason we briefly review the issues and  economic analysis conducted in  four 
recent trade disputes. Two CVD cases  brought by  the  United States against Canada 
(softwood lumber and hogs/pork), one Section 22 investigation against Canada (durum 
wheat) and one CVD action brought by Canada against the United States (corn). 
The purpose of these reviews is not to provide the definitive economic analysis of 
each case but instead to illustrate the range of issues which must be addressed and the 
types of economic analysis undertaken. 13 
CASE STUDIES 
CASE 1: The United States CVD Case Against Canadian Softwood Lumber 
In 1991, Canada exported about 70% of its softwood lumber production and  77% 
of its exports were to the United States.  Canada is essentially the sole for~ign supplier of 
softwood lumber in the U.S. market. This bilateral softwood lumber trade was worth $2.82 
billion (USITC, 1992) in 1991, and this figure illustrates the  vigour of trade in the sector. 
However, despite its size, or perhaps because of its size, softwood lumber has been at the 
centre of a lengthy and heated trade dispute. 
The market share of Canadian softwood lumber in the United States rose from 17% 
in  1975 to 33%  in  1985 (Doran and  Nostali) and  has since stabilized at 29% (in value 
terms). The increased market share of imported Canadian softwood lumber, during the 
early 1980s, created concern among U.S. lumber producers.  In October 1982, the U.S. 
Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports (a group of eight trade associations and 350 
lumber producing firms) filed a formal CVD complaint against softwood lumber imported 
from Canada.  The Coalition alleged that Canadian  federal and provincial governments 
subsidized Canadian forest products through a number of programs and practices.  In 
November 1982,  the USITC found, in a preliminary ruling, that the U.S. lumber industry_ 
had  been  materially  injured  by  allegedly  subsidized  softwood  lumber  imported  from 
Canada.  However,  in  May  1983,  the  International Trade Administration  (ITA)  of the 
Department  of  Commerce  came  up  with  a  negative  subsidy  determination  which 
terminated  the case.  The  ITA argued  that the  benefits  provided  through  Canada's 
provincial  stumpage  programs  were  not export subsidies  and  the  domestic program 
benefits were "generally available" to all forest products.  10 Since the program benefits were 
generally available, Canada's stumpage programs could not be construed as domestic 
10 Stumpage programs in Canada are operated by the Ministry of Natural Resources in each province. 
Under these programs, individuals and companies acquire the right to cut and remove standing timber from 
Crown lands. The individuals and companies also assume the responsibility to regenerate the forest they 
harvest up to the stage of "free to grow".  The royalty/price/rent paid to the provincial government for the 
standing timber is known as stumpage. 14 
subsidies under U.S. countervailing duty law. 
While the negative determination by the ITA was discouraging to U.S. interests, the 
Coalition did not give up.  In May of 1986, after the market share of imported softwood 
lumber from Canada had risen to 33%,' the Coalition filed a second countervailing duty 
petition.  The Coalition alleged that the provincial governments in Canada sell standing 
timber at "below market value" prices which amounts to an "upstream" subsidy to Canadian 
softwood lumber producers.  The Coalition argued that the growing market share captured 
by Canadian softwood lumber was a reflection of this subsidy and that these imports were 
causing material injury to the U.S. lumber industry.  In July 1986, the USITCs preliminary 
investigation found that the U.S. softwood lumber industry was materially injured because 
of allegedly subsidized softwood lumber imports from Canada.  In October 1986, the ITA 
in  its preliminary determination ruled that softwood lumber imported from Canada was 
subsidized through administratively set stumpage prices and through the provision of public 
resources (eg. expenses for forest regeneration and construction of logging roads)  to 
lumber producers.  The subsidy was calculated to equal 15% ad valorem. 
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 may have contributed to the reversal of the ITA's 
decision about softwood lumber imports from  Canada.  Two provisions of this act are 
particularly notable.  First, the Act provided a reinterpretation of the statute which allowed 
the ITA to find a product to be subsidized and hence subject to CVDs if the subject product 
was produced from subsidized inputs (CSO, p. 28).  Second, the Act required all agencies 
administering U.S. trade laws to give technical assistance to U.S. firms on how to make 
successful AD/CVD petitions (CSO, p.  28).  This assistance may have helped the U.S. 
lumber coalition to redesign its complaint to be more consistent with a positive subsidy 
determination.  No doubt, the fact that the market share of Canadian softwood lumber in 
the U.S. was growing at a faster rate between 1983 and 1986 than in the past (Doran and 
Nostali) also contributed to the decision reversal.  Following the preliminary determination 
of subsidy by the ITA, the USITC ruled that the subsidized softwood lumber imported from 
Canada caused "material injury" to the U.S. lumber industry and immediately imposed a 
15% countervailing duty (CVD) on all softwood lumber imported from Canada. 15 
The final determination of the value of the CVD was to be announced by December 
30,  1986.  However, the CVD case was terminated when the governments of Canada and 
the United States negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on softwood lumber. 
Under the MOU, the government of Canada agreed to impose a 15% export tax on certain 
softwood lumber exports bound for the U.S. market.  The export tax could be reduced or 
eliminated with 30 days notice, if provincial governments adjusted their stumpage fees 
upward and charged an appropriate fee for forest regeneration.  The MOU took effect on 
January 8,  1987 and influenced Canada-U.S. lumber trade for almost five years. 
On  September 3,  1991, the government of Canada unilaterally announced that 
provincial stumpage charges had increased to the extent that it was no longer necessary 
to collect the export tax.  11  Following this action,  U.S. trade representatives announced 
that the Department of Commerce would be self-initiating a CVD case involving softwood 
lumber imports from Canada.  The U.S. government also imposed temporary import duties 
ranging up to 15% on softwood lumber imported from certain provinces of Canada.  This 
duty was imposed as a contingency protection measure while the investigations for final 
subsidy and injury determination were undertaken. 
In May 1992, the ITA reported the results of it's final subsidy determination.  The ITA 
identified two domestic subsidies: provincial stumpage programs and log export restrictions 
in British Columbia.  These two subsidies, according to the ITA, equalled a subsidy margin 
of 6.51 % (2.9% for stumpage and  3.6% for provincial  log  export restrictions  in  British 
Columbia).  Based on this ruling, the USITC started it's final investigation for determining 
material injury.  In  July 1992"  it ruled  that subsidized  softwood  lumber imported from 
Canada caused material injury to lumber producers in the United States.  Accordingly, a 
6.51 % ad valorem duty went into effect on May 28, 1992. 
Although the magnitude of final tariff was less that one-half of its initial value, the 
government of Canada appealed the ITA and ITC decisions to a binational panel under 
Article 1904 of the Canada-U.S.  Free Trade Agreement (FTA).  On July 26,  1993, the 
11  The MOU was terminated on October 4,  1991. 16 
Binational Panel remanded the ITA and ITC decisions. In particular, the Panel asked the 
Department of Commerce to recalculate the softwood lumber dumping margin.  The Panel 
also found that the record  did  not support the finding that Canadian softwood lumber 
imports had a significant price-suppressing effect on the U.S. softwood lumber market.  It 
noted  that the cross-sectoral  comparison  used  by  the  USITC  to  support its  positive 
determination of material injury was "seriously flawed".  As a consequence, the Panel 
asked the USITC to provide additional statistical evidence to support its determination of 
material injury.  Both the ITA and USITC responded to the request.  The ITA revised its 
softwood lumber subsidy estimate to 11.54%, almost double its earlier estimate.  The 
USITC (on the basis of the majority decision) also reaffirmed its original determination of 
material injury to the U.S. softwood lumber industry caused by  subsidized softwood lumber 
imports from  Canada.  After reviewing  the responses from  the  ITA and  the  lTC,  the 
Binational Panel ruled that the analysis of the determination of subsidy was flawed and that 
the lTC's determination of material injury to the U.S.  lumber industry was not based on 
/  sound  statistical  evidence.  As  a  result,  the  Panel  dismissed  the  CVD  case  against 
Canadian softwood lumber on January 28, 1994.
12 
While the case is complex, the softwood lumber dispute deals with the standard 
questions asked in every CVD investigation.  Is Canadian lumber production subsidized? 
Do imports of allegedly subsidized softwood lumber cause material injury to the lumber 
industry in the U.S.? 
In a competitive industry, which seems to characterize the U.S.-Canada softwood 
lumber market, price is determined by the intersection of supply and demand
13
.  The supply 
12  After more than  a decade the  softwood  lumber dispute may  not yet be  over.  Currently,  the 
Department of Commerce is investigating allegations of bias and conflict of interest on the part of some 
members of the Binational Panel.  If it finds the allegations to be true, then the Panel's decision is likely to be 
challenged (USITC 1994a). 
13 According to the USITC (1982), there were 8,367 establishments in the United States and Canada 
involved in producing softwood and hardwood lumber during 1980.  The concentration ratio in this industry 
is also modest.  The five largest companies account for 30% of production  in  the U.S.  and only 22% of 
production in Canada.  These figures suggest that a competitive market model applies to the North American 
softwood lumber industry. 17 
curve is the marginal cost function,  but the supply of timber depends on  a renewable 
natural resource, primarily second-growth forests.  Given the soil and climatic conditions 
in Canada, a typical planting-harvest cycle takes from 60 to 120 years to complete.  Thus, 
the  current stock of timber is  largely fixed.  This  is  true  even  under the  new forest 
management regime which allows large companies to lease crown land for 10-20 years for 
harvesting and regeneration. 
The countervailing duty statute in the U.S. requires the USITC to determine if the 
softwood lumber industry in the United States is materially injured by reason of subsidized 
imports from Canada.  Explicit in this statute is a requirement that the domestic and foreign 
products are "like products".  Many people in the softwood lumber industry, both in the U.S. 
and in Canada, believe that the assumption of like products may not be appropriate for 
softwood lumber produced in Canada (the Spruce-Pine-Fur type) and softwood lumber 
produced in the U.S. (the Southern Yellow Pine).  Most of the softwood lumber imported 
from  Canada is  considered  of better quality because of its straightness, strength and 
superior nail holding ability (Wallace 1987, p.37).  In many end uses, particularly in house 
building, softwood imported from Canada is used for inside framing.  The southern yellow 
pine  has  the  characteristic  of  absorbing  chemicals  (USITC  1992,  pp.  A-72-A-7S). 
Consequently, SYP is used in building patio decks, side walls etc.  At least in this end use, 
softwood lumber imported from Canada and softwood lumber produced in the U.S. appear 
to be complements rather than substitutes.  This finding is consistent with econometric 
evidence that finds  a positive  coefficient for the U.S.  lumber price variable  in  simple 
Canada-U.S. lumber trade models (Buongiorno et al.  1988; Sarker 1993).  If Canadian 
and U.S. softwood lumber are complements, Canadian shipments cannot cause material 
injury. 
The ITA found two countervailable practices in Canada in its final determination: 
provincial  stumpage  programs,  and  log  export  restrictions  in  the  province  of British 
Columbia.  In calculating the subsidy implicit in the stumpage programs, the ITA compared 
the price of stumpage for softwood with the stumpage price for other types of timber.  The 
benchmark  price  for  Alberta  and  Ontario  was  the  price  of  pulp  logs;  for  B.C.,  the 18 
competitively-bid  price  for softwood;  and  for  Quebec,  the  price  for  private  softwood 
stumpage.  Note that, while the production processes of pulp and softwood lumber both 
use timber as an input, these are two different products in the output market.  The demand 
and  supply conditions for these two products in  the North American market are quite 
different.  Since the stumpage fee is determined as a residual value, the. differences in 
output prices  and  the  differences  in  operating  expenses  contribute  to  differences  in 
stumpage rates.  Hence, it is not clear how the differences in these two stumpage rates 
could be used to calculate an appropriate subsidy margin.  Nevertheless, program benefits 
per unit of shipment for each of the four provinces were calculated and then the export 
shares of each  province were  used  as  weights to calculate the average country-wide 
subsidy margin. 
In calculating the subsidy equivalent of the B.C. log export restriction, the ITA noted 
that this was an indirect domestic subsidy to the primary lumber producing industry.  The 
log  export  restrictions  in  British  Columbia,  which  also  prohibits  shipments  to  other 
provinces,  could  depress  local  log  prices  and  give  an  advantage  to  local 
processors/companies in terms of higher rents.  However, the log export restrictions have 
been in place since 1906  and it is unclear why such long standing restrictions have only 
recently become problematic. 
The fact that the supply of timber is fixed and the way in which stumpage fees are 
determined  is  essential  to  understanding  the  economics  of this  case.  In  Canada, 
stumpage fees are set administratively using a "residual" approach.  This residual is the 
difference  between  the  output  price  and  operating  costs  per  unit.  Essentially,  the 
authorities use  a cost of production procedure, where working backwards from the lumber 
price and  subtracting transportation, processing and logging costs the "value" of standing 
timber can be determined.  This is a rent and not profit, as competitive profit is built into the 
firm's  operating  costs.  Under this formula  pricing  system,  actual  stumpage fees  may 
deviate from competitive stumpage charges due to weak competition (constrained entry 
due to high initial capital investment) or overestimation of sawmills' costs.  The question 
is: what is the supply effect of such underpricing?  The answer is zero. Why? 19 
Since stumpage is an economic rent,  it's over or under collection by a resource 
owner does not alter supply decisions unless it is so high as to cause firms to shut-down. 
Ricardo (pp. 38-39) made this point when he noted, 
"[The price of] Corn is not high because a rent is paid,  but a rent is paid 
because corn is high; it has been justly observed that no reduction would 
take place in the price of corn although landlord should forego the whole of 
their rent.  Such a measure would only enable some farmers to live like a 
gentlemen, but would not diminish the quantity of labour necessary to raise 
raw produce on the least productive land in cultivation". 
Therefore, the stumpage fees charged in Canada cannot have any price depressing effect 
in the U.S. market, since they do not influence the supply of lumber! 
On a number of grounds it appears that the U.S. softwood lumber industries case 
was shaky.  However, the statistical analysis of Baldwin and Steagall shows that the most 
important variable influencing a positive CVD determination is the ratio of total imports to 
consumption, and there is no question that Canada's share of the U.S. softwood lumber 
market was increasing. 
CASE 2: The U.S. cve Case Against Canadian Hogs and Pork 
Canada, like many developed countries, has a long history of providing price and 
income support to farmers.  Although agriculture in Canada is a shared responsibility of 
federal and provincial governments, the federal government was largely responsible for 
providing  income  stabilization  programs  until  the  early  1970s  (Meilke  and  Warley). 
Following  this  time  period,  a  number  of provinces  introduced  farm  income  support 
programs  which  reflected  province-specific desires.  Among  these  were programs to 20 
support the incomes of red meat producers.  By the mid-1980s competitive subsidization 
of red  meat producers, across provinces was a well recognized problem.  An amended 
National Tripartite Stabilization Plan,  ~hich provided floor prices to hog producers and 
imposed negotiated ceilings on support to the red  meat sector appeared to be a viable 
solution to the problem(Meilke).14  While the formation of the NTSP helped to bring diverse 
provincial hog stabilization programs under one set of rules and some felt it would be 
considered generally available under u.s. trade law, in retrospect, it may have made hog 
stabilization payments an easier target for countervailing duty action by the United States. 
However, the hog/pork trade dispute preceded the establishment of the National 
Tripartite Stabilization Plan, and like softwood lumber the dispute has stretched over more 
than a decade.  In  November 1984, the United States National Pork Producers Council 
along with a number of meat packers in the United States filed a CVD petition with the 
Department of Commerce and USITC against hogs and pork imported from Canada.  After 
the preliminary investigation the ITA identified twenty-four federal and provincial programs 
providing countervailable subsidies to hog and pork producers in Canada.  The calculated 
subsidy was $0.0439 per pound of liveweight.  The ITA considered hogs and pork to be 
members of the same industry and based on its subsidy determination, the U.S. imposed 
preliminary duties equal to the subsidy margin  on  both  hogs and  pork imported from 
Canada. 
In  its preliminary investigation of material injury, the USITC overturned the ITA's 
14 Tripartite because it is funded jointly by producers and both levels of government. 21 
preliminary decision that hogs and pork were members of the same industry and treated 
hogs and pork as separate industries.  Based on its preliminary investigation, the ITC found 
that hog  producers  in  the  United  States were materially injured  by  hog  imports from 
Canada, but that there was no evidence of material injury or threat of material injury to the 
U.S. pork sector.  This began a long series of appeals and remands.  A chronology and 
discussion  of the  various  judicial  decisions  made  in  the  decade  since  the  original 
investigation is beyond the scope of this paper, and has been well documented in the work 
of Meilke and van Duren; Meilke and Moschini; Veeman; and Ludwick.  Suffice it to say, 
appeals have been  heard  by United States Court of International Trade,  at least two 
binational panels formed under the FT  A, two extraordinary challenge committees under the 
FTA and by the GATT.  The result has been the continuous application of countervailing 
duties  on  Canada's  exports  of live  hogs  to  the  United  States,  with  no  permanent 
application of duties against imports of Canadian pork.  There have been temporary duties 
applied to pork imports during various stages of the dispute. 
Given the length of the hogs and pork dispute and the multitude of legal actions it 
is easy to lose sight of the basic economics of the case.  Before proceeding, it is useful to 
recount four facts on which both the United States and Canada agree.  First, the dispute 
involves domestic production subsidies, export subsidies were never an issue.  Second, 
both hogs and pork are priced in competitive North American markets.  Third, with the 
exception of  technical regulations involving Canada's importing of hogs, no significant trade 
barriers inhibit trade between Canada and the United States in  either the hog  or pork 
markets.  Fourth,  of the  domestic  production  subsidies  identified  by  United  States 22 
authorities, almost all were paid to hog, not pork producers. 
Given these facts there are three key questions that need to be answered in this 
trade dispute. 





If  Canadian hog and  pork production is subsidized do these subsidies 
materially injure United States hog and pork producers? 
If  hog and pork producers in the United States are injured as a result 
of Canada's domestic production subsidies, what is the appropriate 
remedy? 
On the subsidy question the issue hinges on the "specificity" of Canada's domestic 
production subsidies.  The Department of Commerce ruled that the production subsidies 
given to Canadian hog producers through various federal and provincial programs are not 
generally available to all producers in agriculture and hence, can be considered specific 
to the hog  sector.  Canada argued that while the National Tripartite Stabilization Plan 
applied to only a limited number of commodities,  nearly all other Canadian agricultural 
commodities were covered by some form  of stabilization plan.  At least one binational 
panel agreed with the Canadian point of view, but from an economic perspective it seems 
clear that the type of deficiency payment program used in the hog sector does have the 
potential to increase the output of hogs.  More will be said about this when considering 
injury.  Further, the Department of Commerce ruled  the production subsidies given to 
Canadian hog producers were equivalent to subsidies being given to pork producers.  On 
this point they were clearly wrong.  Both Canadian and  United  States pork producers 23 
benefit from Canadian hog production subsidies to the extent that they lower the price for 
their major input.  Packers in both countries buy hogs on the open market and sell pork on 
the open market.  The production subsidies in Canada, assuming perfect arbitrage and that 
Canada remains an exporter of both hogs and pork, provide no competitive advantage to 
pork producers located in Canada. 
On the question of injury the economics are simple.  First,  have Canadian hog 
production  subsidies  increased  Canadian  hog  production  and  exports?  Most of the 
available econometric estimates on this issue would suggest the answer is either not at all, 
or to a very limited extent (Martin and Goddard).  Second, has the increase in Canadian 
hog production and exports caused by the production subsidies, reduced the United States 
hog price to such an extent as to cause material injury to United States hog producers? 
Again, the available economic analysis would suggest the answer is  no (Moschini and 
Meilke; Meilke and Scally).  In essence, a proper economic analysis must trace the causal 
effect from the domestic production subsidies through to the increase, if any, in Canadian 
exports of hogs and pork to the United States, and then to the price impact in the United 
States market.  Injury, if it has occurred, results from the marginal increase in Canadian 
production and exports resulting from the production subsidies - not from the entire quantity 
of hog exports into the United States market.  To argue otherwise would suggest that 
Canadian exports of hogs would be zero in the absence of the production subsidies, a 
conclusion which has no support either in theory or in reality. 
The USITC in some of their economic analyses appeared to accept this argument 
but applied it in  a flawed  manner.  To analyze the effects of Canadian  hog  and  pork 24 
exports on the United States market, the USITC estimated injury to U.S. hog producers by: 
1)  calculating  the  ratio  of  Canadian  hog  marketings  to  total  North  American  hog 
marketings; 2) determining the change in this ratio from year to year;  and  3)  using the 
change in this ratio to determine the impact of Canadian production subsidies on U.S. hog 
prices based on a range (-1.0 to -2.0) of domestic demand flexibilities.  The USITC logic 
suggests that any increase in Canada's North American market share of hog production 
results from its domestic hog subsidies.  Interestingly, it also suggests that a decline in 
Canada's  North  American  market share  is  also  a  result  of Canadian  hog  production 
subsidies!  In fact, in one year of the USITC's analyses Canada's market share did decline. 
We  have already argued that it is  difficult to see how Canada's hog production 
subsidies provide a competitive disadvantage or materially injured  United  States pork 
producers.  However, based on simple correlations and trend analysis this was the USITCs 
conclusion.  Both a GATT panel and a FTA binational panel agreed with the Canadian 
position that the United States would have to conduct an upstream subsidy investigation. 
An upstream subsidy investigation would require the United States to show that Canada's 
hog production subsidies provided a competitive benefit to Canadian pork producers and 
materially injured  U.S.  packers.  It was simply  incorrect to  assume that 100% of the 
subsidies provided to swine producers were passed through to pork producers without 
establishing factually what proportion of the subsidy, if any, was passed through. 
While the  USITC  was wrong  to  assume that the full  impact of hog  production 
subsidies applied to the pork production sector, the vertically linked nature of this market 
is important in determining the proper remedy for a domestic production subsidy.  While 25 
Canada's domestic production subsidies provide no competitive advantage to Canadian 
pork  producers,  a  countervailing  duty  applied  only  to  hog  production  does.  A 
countervailing duty on hogs lowers Canada's hog prices below the free trade equilibrium 
price thus providing  considerable effective protection to the Canadian pork producing 
industry.  Moschini and Meilke show that an upstream subsidy investigation is required to 
determine the pass through of hog  production  subsidies to the pork sector.  Using  a 
vertically integrated trade model, Moschini and Meilke derive the analytical expressions for 
the proper CVDs for hogs and pork.  The proper CVD differs depending on whether the 
objective of the complainant country is to protect the interests of hog producers only, or to 
protect the interests of both hog and pork producers.  The CVDs in either case depend on 
the elasticities of supply and demand for hogs and pork.  If the objective is to protect the 
interests of both hog and pork producers, the CVDs must be imposed on both products. 
However, the level of the CVD should be less than the subsidy margin in both cases and 
the  CVD  on  pork should  be  less than that on  hogs.  While this  analysis  is  relatively 
sophisticated,  it  would  seem  to  have  wide  applicability  in  both  the  agricultural  and 
manufacturing sectors. 
CASE 3: The United States Section 22 Case Against Durum Wheat from Canada 
Prior to the signing of the FTA, only a trickle of wheat crossed the border between 
Canada and the United States. Canada had a restrictive import licensing system for wheat, 
and the U.S. imposed a tariff of $0.21  per bushel.  However, both countries agreed on a 
formula to eliminate these trade barriers during the FTA negotiations and on May 9,1991 26 
Canada removed its import licensing system.  Although the U.S. is the world's dominant 
wheat exporter,  it has recently become an  important destination for Canadian  wheat 
exports.  This is particularly true for premium quality durum wheat produced in Western 
Canada.  Since 1989, Canadian wheat exports to the U.S. have increased steadily, rising 
to over two million metric tonnes in 1993/94.  While these shipments  were only 3% of the 
total U.S. wheat availability, in 1993/94, wheat imports from Canada became a hot political 
issue (Loyns, Knutson and Meilke).  In fact, political bickering and manouvering to protect 
the interests of durum wheat producers in the U.S. began almost immediately after the FTA 
was ratified. 
Initially, durum wheat producers in North Dakota complained that the freight subsidy 
given to Canadian durum producers under the Western Grains Transportation Act (WGTA) 
constituted an export subsidy and hence, violated Article 701.2 of the FTA.15  The U.S. 
Trade Representative investigated this complaint and determined that the wheat shipped 
to the U.S. did not receive the freight subsidy, and that any specific transportation subsidy 
was generally available to all grain shipments from Western Canada to Thunder Bay.16 
Consequently,  Canada  did  not  violate  the  FTA.  After  this  determination,  the  U.S. 
Congress, which was under pressure from the wheat producers lobby,  requested the 
15 Article 701.2 of the FTA states that:  "Neither party shall introduce or maintain any export subsidy 
on any agricultural goods Originating in,  or shipped from,  its territory that are exported directly or indirectly to 
the territory of  the other  party." 
16  Small quantities of wheat destined for the U.S. have been shipped through Thunder Bay in order 
to be eligible for transportation subsidies to that paint.  The WGTA transportation subsidy was eliminated on 
August 1,  1995. 27 
USITC to examine the "conditions of competition" between the U.S. and Canadian durum 
industries.  In  response to this  request,  the  USITC  initiated  a  332  investigation  and 
submitted its final report in  June 1990.  The USITC stated in its report that: 
"it is  not apparent from  the  data  collected by the  Commission  in  this 
investigation  that  prices  paid by U. S.  Millers  for  Canadian  durum  are 
significantly different than prices paid for U.S.  durum.  [USITC 1990, p. ix]. .... 
For like quantities of  wheat,  U. S. prices and Canadian prices fluctuate,  with 
no  consistent price  difference  between  U. S.  and Canadian  durum  that 
explains the growth ofdurum imports from Canada between 1986 and 1989. 
[USITC 1990, p.  7-1]" 
The USITC concluded that the durum industries in U.S. and Canada are competitive 
and that the drought of 1987-89 was the main reason for the increased Canadian durum 
shipments  into the  United  States.  However,  this  did  not bury the  issue.  Relentless 
lobbying by durum producers located in the Northern Plains states resulted in the  U.S. 
government bringing the case of Canadian durum imports before a binational panel formed 
under Chapter 18 of the FTA.  The U.S.  government argued that the Canadian Wheat 
Board (CWB) had violated Article 701.3 of the FTA by selling wheat in  the U.S. below 
acquisition cost (including storage, handling and freight).  Article 701.3 of the FTA prohibits 
either of the signatories from exporting agricultural commodities to the other country at less 
than its acquisition price.17  The Binational Panel made its final ruling in favour of Canada 
in January 1993.  The panel could find no compelling evidence that the CWB was selling 
17Article 701.3 states that:  "Neither party, including any public entity that it establishes or maintains, 
shall sell agricultural goods for export to the territory of  the other  party at a price below the acquisition price 
of  the goods plus any storage, handling or other costs incurred by it with respect to those goods." 28 
durum wheat in the U.S. market at prices lower than its acquisition costs.  A number of 
weather related and political events have contributed to the most recent round of the wheat 
trade dispute.  Adverse weather conditions in the U.  S.  during the Summer of 1993/94 
resulted in higher demand for Canadian wheat in the U.S. market.  Due to .f1ooding in the 
Midwest, an increased quantity of Canadian wheat was transported by road to elevators 
in Montana and North Dakota.  This made the trade more visible and the timing could not 
have been better, for U.S. wheat producers, because President Clinton was desperate for 
votes to gain Congressional approval of the NAFT  A. As a consequence, some members 
of Congress, particularly those from the Northern Plain States, told the President that their 
support for the NAFTA hinged on  his taking action against imports of Canadian wheat. 
After a  successful  NAFTA vote,  President  Clinton  directed  the  USITC  to  initiate  an 
investigation under Section 22 of the AAA to determine whether wheat, wheat flour and 
semolina imported  into the  United  States from  Canada was taking  place "under such 
conditions or in  such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially-
interfere with, the price support, payment and production adjustment program conducted 
by the Department of Agriculture for wheat" (USITC 1994, p. A-3). 
A Section 22 investigation differs from a CVD investigation in that there is no need 
for the U.S. to demonstrate that foreign exports are subsidized, or that they are injuring 
U.S.  producers.  All that is required is to show that the imports are interfering with U.S. 
agricultural  support  programs.  As  directed  by  the  President,  the  USITC  started  its 
investigation on January 18, 1994.  The final report of this investigation was forwarded, 
along with a number of recommendations to the President on June 15, 1994.  The USITC 29 
determined (by the majority decision) that Canadian wheat, wheat flour, and semolina were 
not being imported under such conditions and in such quantities as to render, or tend to 
render,  ineffective the USDA wheat program.  While the determination was generally 
negative, the USITC provided the President with recommended levels of  import restrictions 
should the President determine (contrary to its findings) that there was evidence of material 
interference (USITC 1994b, pp. b-1  - b-18). 
On  August  1,  1994, the wheat trade  dispute came to  an  end  as  a  result of a 
negotiated settlement.  Canada agreed to limit wheat exports to the United States while 
the U.S. agreed not to pursue an Article XXVIII action under the GATT to restrict wheat 
imports.  Under this agreement, tariff rate quotas were used to restrict U.S.  imports of 
wheat from the CWB18.  The voluntary export restraint agreement was for one year and 
expired in September 1995 (Alston et al.).  A binational commission of nongovernmental 
experts has been appointed to examine all aspects of the Canadian and the U.S. grain 
marketing and support systems. During the Commission's investigation, the U.S. agreed 
to place no restrictions on Canadian wheat shipments and Canada agreed not to take 
action against the U.S. on wheat under the WTO or NAFTA. The Commission's mandate 
was to "assist the two governments in reaching long-term solutions to existing problems 
in  the grain  sector"  (Canada-United  States  Joint Commission  on  Grains,  p.  1).  The 
Commission's preliminary report was delivered in June 1995 and its recommendations  met 
18 For durum wheat the tariff rates were as follows: $3/t for the first 300 kt;  $23/t for the next 150 kt 
and $501t for imports above 450 kt.  For "other"  wheat from the CWB, the tariff rate was $3/t for the first 1.05 
million tons and a tariff rate of $50/t for imports above that limit.  There were no restrictions on wheat flour, 
semolina or Canadian soft red winter wheat imported from outside the CWB area. 30 
with a largely hostile reaction in Canada.  The Commission's final report was expected to 
be  completed  by  September  1995,  but the  final  wording  of the  report  is  still  under 
discussion.  The Commission's recommendations are  not binding on either country and 
the wheat dispute seems to be off the front of  the political burner for at least three reasons: 
1) the U. S. gave up its Section 22 wavier in the  Uruguay Round of trade negotiations; 2) 
the U.S.  has cut-back on the use of export subsidies; and 3)  international wheat prices 
have increased significantly. 
Nonetheless the economic analysis used by the USITC to investigate the durum 
wheat dispute is interesting and illustrates their role in trade disputes not involving ADs or 
CVDs.  In  addition, this case is one of the few times the USITC has used an estimated 
econometric model to examine historical evidence of causal relationships embodied in 
data.  Perhaps, the Commission had  little choice.  The evidence presented, by various 
parties,  in  the  USITC  hearings were  based  on  a wide variety  of formal  and  informal 
economic models.  On  behalf of the CWB,  Sumner, Alston and  Gray (SAG) presented 
results  from  a formal  econometric model  which  was  used  to  examine  the  effects  of 
Canadian wheat imports on the U.S. wheat market, including an extensive discussion of 
the  assumptions  and  parameters  underlying  the  model.  The  Law  and  Economics 
Consulting  Group made a submission on  behalf of U.S.  wheat producers arguing that 
imported  Canadian  wheat was  underpriced  in  the  U.S.  market because  its  quality  is 
understated.  The USDA argued. based on expert opinion, that wheat imports from Canada 
increased wheat supplies in the U.S., and lowered domestic wheat prices. The lower price 
then resulted in higher defiCiency payments and higher program costs.  Hence, it argued, 31 
Canadian wheat imports interfered with domestic price and  income support programs 
under Section 22 of the U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (amended).  Abel, Daft 
and Earley presented economic analysis on behalf of the Millers National Federation, the 
National Pasta Association and the National Grain Trade Council arguing that imports of 
Canadian wheat increased because of lower wheat production in the U.S., than in previous 
years,  attributable  to  weather  and  USDA  farm  policies.  After  reviewing  all  these 
arguments,  models  and  results,  the  USITC  staff concluded  that  the  results  of any 
quantitative analysis depend on  assumed supply and demand elasticities and that the 
more elastic the relevant response functions, the lower the impacts on  U.S. prices and 
program costs. 
It is important to keep the legal issue involved in this case clearly in mind: what is 
the magnitude of the effect of Canadian wheat exports on U.S. wheat prices and hence on 
the costs of U.S. government support programs?  The direction of effect is obvious, only 
the size of  the effect is at issue. The import-induced program costs estimated by the USDA 
were $230.4 million ($0.12 per bushel), while SAG estimated the costs to be 25.9 million 
($0.014 per bushel) and  the USITC (1994b)  $73.2 million  ($0.038 per bushel),  all  for 
1993/94.  The  USITC  investigated  this  issue  using  the  Vector Autoregression(VAR) 
methodology popularized by Sims (1980, 1986).  They specified a five dimensional VAR 
with domestic supply, domestic demand, exports, ending stocks and average market price 
of wheat as the variables.  19  Note that in a VAR framework, all variables are endogenous. 
19  The USITC VAR-model did not account for the US-EEP program, a seemingly serious omission. 32 
The USITC estimated this five-variable VAR using quarterly data from 1979:1 to 1993:2 
and generated impulse responses from the model.  Based on their analysis, the USITC 
concluded that since imports of Canadia.n durum wheat constituted only a small proportion 
of the entire  U.S.  wheat market,  the  changes  in  the  supply  of durum wheat due to 
Canadian exports had not influenced the average wheat price,  in the U.S.  and had not 
affected program costs to a "statistically significant degree". 
This  paper is  not the  proper forum  in  which  to  provide  a  detailed  critique  of 
agricultural  commodity  modelling  and  policy  analysis.  It  is  always  easier to criticize 
empirical work than it is to conduct high quality analysis.  However, this case illustrates the 
inherent limitations of empirical economics.  If we knew the "true" economic model then 
perhaps we could determine if the effect of Canadian wheat exports was to lower U.S. 
wheat prices by one cent or twelve cents.  Unfortunately, we never know the "true" model 
and discrepancies of a few cents in the prediction of any impact multiplier, from different 
economic models, is hardly surprising or cause for great concern. 
In fact, even if we knew the "true" impact multiplier for Canadian wheat imports, the 
outcome may not have been different in the absence of an exact definition of "material 
interference."  The  determination  of material  interference  is  a  decision  made  by  the 
President, and it is beyond the USITCs jurisdiction. Consequently, in the absence of a 
precise definition of what constitutes material interference, does a difference of a few cents 
in  economic estimates really matter?  If there is  a compelling  political reason,  a price 
depressing effect of even one cent per bushel could be interpreted as causing material 
interference with the operation of domestic support programs. 33 
CASE 4: Canadian cve Case Against United States Corn 
Canada's CVD case against U.S. corn is interesting because it is the only example 
of a successful CVD action against the United States and because it illustrates the use of 
a public interest hearing to help set the final duty. 
Grain  corn  is  grown  commercially  in  only three  Canadian  provinces  : Ontario, 
Quebec and Manitoba.  Ontario accounts for 75-80% of total Canadian corn production 
which reached 7.0 mmt by the late 1980s.  During the 1970s corn production increased 
substantially, particularly in Ontario and Quebec due to the development of short season 
hybrids suitable for cooler climatic  conditions.  Between  mid-1970s and  mid-1980s, 
Canada moved gradually towards self-sufficiency in  corn production.  Imports declined 
from an average of 1.0 mmt, about 17% of domestic production during 1978-1980, to 0.48 
mmt and 7% of domestic production by 1984-1986.  In fact, by the 1980s Canada was 
becoming an occasional net exporter of corn.  The increasing importance of corn in Ontario 
made producers more sensitive to U.S. corn prices and support programs.  Although corn 
imports from the U.S. had gradually declined, Ontario corn prices are set in the U.S. market 
where  Canada  is  the  classic small  country  price-taker.  Thus,  if U.S.  farm  policies 
contribute to higher corn production and hence lower market prices for corn, the effect is 
quickly transmitted into Canada.  For example, between the 1983-84 and 1986-87 crop 
years the average corn  price in  the  U.S.  declined from  $3.25/bushel to $1.57/bushel. 
However, corn producers' in the U.S. were largely protected from income losses by a target 
price that remained at $3.03/bushel.  While increased deficiency payments, $1.46/bushel 
in  1986-87, protected U.S.  corn producers,  Canadian corn producers received support 34 
through a stabilization program where support was designed to ratchet downward (95% 
of the five-year moving average price).  Although the stabilization program provided a 
safety-net for Canadian producers in the short-run, the future prospects were not very 
encouraging. 
Faced with dim prospects for higher market prices, the newly formed Ontario Corn 
Producer's Association filed a countervailing duty action against the United States in the 
Fall of 1986.  The Association alleged that U.S. farm programs for corn had increased 
production above what would have occurred in an unsubsidized market and that the lower 
corn prices resulting from these subsidies were causing material injury to Canadian corn 
producers.  Under Canadian law, Revenue Canada determines if the alleged product is 
subsidized and the size of the subsidy20.  The Canadian Import Tribunal then determines 
whether the subsidy has caused, is causing, or is likely to cause material injury to domestic 
producers. 
After  a  preliminary  investigation,  Revenue  Canada  determined  that U.S.  corn 
subsidies led  to  higher than  normal  (i.e.,  market determined)  production  of corn  and 
depressed corn prices.  The countervailable subsidy was calculated to be $1.05/bushel, 
in  U.S.  currency.  This  calculated  subsidy  margin  was  lowered,  in  January  1987 to 
$0.85/bushel ($1.1 O/bushel Can.). 
On March 6,  1987, the CIT determined that imports of subsidized grain corn in all 
forms,  excluding seed  corn,  sweet corn  and  popping corn from the United States had 
20  Canada's procedures in this respect are very similar to those in the United States (van Duren). 35 
caused, was causing and was likely to cause material injury to Canadian corn producers. 
While we  are not going to  review the economic arguments  in  this case the  result  is 
interesting because injury was found at the same time imports of  corn, both in absolute and 
relative terms were declining.  The ruling affirmed that domestic policies can "harm" foreign 
producers, even when imports are not increasing. 
The corn  case is  interesting  for another reason.  It was the first time the CIT 
conducted "public interest" hearings where different groups, individuals and businesses 
made  their views  known  about  the  likely  impact  of the  countervailing  duty  on  their 
economic interests
21
•  Following these hearings, the CIT advises the Minister of Finance 
if it is in the public interest to impose a partial countervailing duty.  The final decision is 
made by the Minister of Finance. 
During  the  course  of the  public interest investigation,  the  CIT arranged  public 
hearings and  received  representations from a number of corn  users who claimed that 
imposition of the CVD would not be in the public interest.  The CIT, after considering the 
evidence advised the Minister of Finance that the imposition of a CVD on corn imports from 
the U.S. in excess of $O.30/bushel Can. would not be in the public interest.  On February 
4, 1988, the Minister of Finance reduced the CVD to $0.46/bushel.  Hence, the final CVD 
was set at less than one-half of the calculated subsidy.  While this determination did not 
rely  on  estimated supply and  demand curves or formal welfare analysis,  the  result is 
consistent with the argument that the proper CVD for domestic subsidies is lower than the 
21  Since 1984 the CIT has been required to hold public interest hearings in CVD cases. 36 
subsidy margin and  that the interests of other economic agents should  be  taken  into 
account in a CVD investigation. 
LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
The preceding  case studies provide considerable "food for thought."  First,  the 
arsenal that United States industries have to challenge imports they perceive as being 
unfairly traded is impressive.  Second, the quality of the economic analysis used to address 
the issue of unfairly traded imports does not always meet professional standards.  Third, 
national CVD laws,  regional dispute settlement procedures developed within free trade 
areas, and improved dispute settlement procedures within the WTO have the potential to 
conflict and overlap with one another, creating different bodies of trade law and general 
confusion.  There must be a better way, and we would like to offer a proposal which draws 
upon the strengths of the recent reforms, while eliminating some of the weaknesses of the 
current system.  Any proposal for reform must be judged against its ultimate objectives. 
Our proposal seeks to  move the world  economy towards more liberal and  predictable 
international trade in  agrifood products.  At the same time,  it recognizes that domestic 
industries  should  have  recourse  against  imports  "unfairly"  subsidized  by  foreign 
governments.  However,  these  rules  should  be  transparent,  the  economic  analysis 
underpinning the decisions beyond reproach and the process as timely and as harassment 
free as possible.  This is a tall order - but a worthy objective. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to briefly review the current status of agriculture within 
the  WTO.  The  WTO  has  taken  on  the  responsibility  of monitoring  and  policing  the 37 
Agreement on Agriculture.  This will involve making sure countries live up to their export 
subsidy reduction commitments, do not exceed their calculated aggregate measure of 
support and  that the  minimum  access  commitments specified  in  the various  country 
schedules are upheld.  In addition, the WTO will be called upon to make rulings with regard 
to countries using innovative tactics to circumvent the commitments they have made.  The 
WTO also sets the ground rules for national CVD investigations and it will get more heavily 
involved in these disputes as a result of its "policeman's" role with regard to the Agreement 
on Agriculture, which contains the exceptions for agricultural products from the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which governs trade in manufactured products. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the rules of the WTO, in condensed form,  as they apply to 
CVD investigations of manufactured and agricultural products.  For manufactured goods 
export subsidies and domestic use regulations are prohibited, while for agriculture only 
export subsidies on "new" goods not identified in a country's tariff schedule are prohibited. 
For manufactured  products  actionable subsidies and  a presumption  of serious 
prejudice apply to ad valorem subsidies greater than 5%, government debt forgiveness and 
subsidies to cover an industry's operating losses.  For agriculture, actionable subsidies 
include export subsidies and some forms of specific domestic subsidies. 
The list of "non-actionable" subsidies for manufactured products is relatively short. 
It  includes  generally  available  subsidies  as  well  as  specific  subsidies  for  research 
assistance to  developed  regions  and  assistance to  promote the  adoption  of existing 
facilities  to  new  environmental  requirements.  Even  for  these  subsidies,  there  are 38 
restrictions applied to the allowable expenditures.  For agriculture, the list of non-actionable 
subsidies is much longer.  Most notably,  it allows subsidies to be made to agriculture 
through direct payments and financial pa~icipation in safety net programs, as long as these 
programs meet certain criteria.  The result of these differences, in the way subsidies on 
manufactured goods and subsidies on agricultural products are handled, means that in 
many cases national administered protection agencies decisions on agrifood CVDs will be 
appealed to the wrO.  Any new Canadian income stabilization plan will be developed with 
a  close  eye  on  the  "green"  criteria  of the wro.  If these  programs  are  treated  as 
commodity specific, in a United States trade action, Canada will appeal the ruling to the 
wrO.  While this makes work for lawyers and perhaps even economists, it is not a healthy 
situation for industries that are attempting to sell their products internationally.  To a large 
extent this justifies our proposal that the wro become the only dispute settlement body 
for CVDs. 
If the wro  is going to become the primary judicial body to deal with CVDs - is there-
still a role for national administered protection agencies, like the USITC and CITT?  We 
believe there is.  In fact, a redefined mandate for national administered protection agencies 
would facilitate increasingly liberal trade compared to their current role as essentially a 
protector of national interests. 
What do we perceive as  the  new role for the national  administered  protection 
agencies?  Essentially we would envisage them having three primary functions: 1) as a 
"transparency" agent; 2) as an investigatory agent; and 3) as an advocacy agent. 
The call for a "transparency" agency is far from origina! having been made by both 39 
Leutwiler and Long.  Leutwiler suggested the agency should operate at the international 
level and Long at the national level.  The objective of these agencies would be to calculate 
and publicize the  costs and benefits of various domestic and trade policies.  Leutwiler 
called this a "protection balance sheet" and the national 'model generally held up a shining 
example is the Australian  Industry Commission.  The essential argument is  that good 
economic policy can only be made in the full light of day - where the disparate costs of 
domestic and trade policies are made as apparent as the concentrated benefits of most 
policy actions (Spriggs).  In the agrifood sector, the calculation and publication of producer 
subsidy equivalents has been helpful not only in exposing the horrendous international 
costs of agricultural support policies, but also in illustrating the comparative costs across 
commodity sectors within national economies.  This is especially true where protection in 
some sectors is provided by hidden policies, such as import and tariff rate quotas, while 
the protection for other sectors is in the form of highly visible output and input subsidies. 
It should be noted that the role we foresee for a national transparency agency is 
considerably different than that of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism created within the 
WTO.  The WTOs trade policy reviews are designed to 'examine the impact of a member's 
trade policies on the multilateral trading system.  The transparency agencies mandate 
would be to examine the impact of its own countries domestic and trade policies on its own 
consumers,  producers  and  taxpayers.  In  this  way,  the  national  agencies  become 
advocates for trade liberalization.  To properly fulfill this role, the national agencies need 
to be removed, to the extent possible, from the political process.  At times, the economic 
analysis of the transparency agency will be popular with politicians, but many times it won't. 40 
For this reason, it is important that the analysis be undertaken by a domestic as opposed 
to an international body.  It is just to easy to ignore "foreign" economic advice.  However, 
in order to maintain political support the agency would need other roles
22
• 
The second  role we foresee is  as an  investigatory agent.  Domestically this  is 
consistent with the transparency function since doing quality economic analysis requires 
top flight institutional knowledge.  We would also envisage the agency undertaking studies 
of foreign governments and foreign government policies.  This serves two purposes.  First, 
like a section 332 investigation, it provides a bone to throw to domestic vested interests. 
It  is  also  always  helpful when the  President or Prime  Minister can  say,  "there  is  an 
investigation underway."  In  many cases these investigations may absolve the foreign 
government of any wrong doing.  In other cases, the investigation might uncover unfair 
trade practices.  Models for this type of activity could be the analyses that the Australian 
Bureau  of Agricultural  and  Resource  Economics  undertook of the  United  States  and 
European  Community agricultural  policies.  It  might also mirror the economic analysis 
undertaken by the Canada-United States Joint Commission on Grain. 
Finally, we see a third role as an advocacy agent.  This would most clearly mirror 
the current mandate of national administered protection agencies.  Domestic industries that 
felt they were being harmed by foreign subsidies would approach the agency indicating 
they wanted  to take  action  against a foreign  government subsidy  in  the  WTO.  The 
22  We will leave it to those in public administration to decide if the separate roles we envisage can 
coexist in a single agency.  We believe they can and that there are good reasons for dOing so, gg. the sharing 
of common knowledge about economics, industries and institutions. 41 
advocacy agency would undertake economic analysis of the industry's claim.  Hopefully, 
the agency could filter out false or weak claims and refer enough others to the investigatory 
agency that only a relatively few cases would actually be taken to the wrO.  At this point, 
the agency would become the spokesman for the domestic industry.  It would prepare 
state-of-the-art economic analysis to back up the domestic industry's claims. 
There are several potential shortcomings of our proposal.  First, that the wro 
would be overwhelmed by cases.  This might be a problem even under  the current rules, 
as  more and  more disputes are taken to the wrO.  However,  it is  not clear that our 
proposal would  result in  more cases.  In  fact,  if the  advocacy agency is  doing  its job 
properly, it should filter out a large number of the smaller and less Significant cases before 
they ever reach the wrO.  A second objection, is that it might discriminate against poor, 
less developed countries.  We believe this is a non-issue.  What could be more difficult, for 
any country, than attempting to defend itself in a foreign nation under their unique rules 
and  institutions?  At least at the wro everyone would  be following  a common set of 
procedures  and  rules.  Poorer  countries  could  pool  resources  to  hire  lawyers  and 
economists to make their case in  Geneva.  They would  not require different teams of 
lawyers in the United States, Canada and the European Union.  Finally, our proposal would 
require that the wro develop legal and economic talent to undertake the role we have 
suggested.  This is essentially an institutional issue that can be handled with the proper 
provision of resources, training and manpower. 
By far the biggest objection to our proposal is that national governments, particularly 
the United States, may never concede this authority to a foreign body.  While it is difficult 42 
to  be  optimistic on  this  score,  we  think there  is  some  hope  for  progress.  With  the 
expansion  of  regional  trading  agreements  and  their  attendant  dispute  settlement 
mechanisms, and the increasing propensity to take disputes to the wro, it may become 
obvious  that  three  different  levels  of  dispute  settlement  are  inefficient  and 
counterproductive.  We are hopeful that progress can be made in this area during the next 
round of multilateral trade negotiations. 43 
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Table 1:  WTO Rules as they Apply to Subsides and Countervailing Measures: 
Manufactured Products 
Prohibited Subsidies: 
- Government Transfers of Funds, Revenue Foregone or Provision of Services other than General 
Infrastructure to a Specific Industry 
- Income or Price Support 
- Export Subsidies 
- Domestic Use Regulations 
Actionable Subsidies: 
- Ad Valorem Subsidization Exceeds 5%23 
- Subsidies to Cover an Industries Operating Losses22 
- Forgiveness of Government Held Debt22 
Non-Actionable Subsidies: 
- Generally Available Subsidies 
- Specific Subsidies Which Met the Following Conditions: 
- ad valorem subsidization less than 1  % 
assistance for research activities if the assistance covers not more than 75% of the 
costs of industrial research or 50% of the costs of pre-competitive development 
activity24 
assistance to disadvantaged regions, based on specified development criteria23 
23  These subsidies must also be shown to have trade effects as described in the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
24  Other conditions apply. 48 
assistance  to  promote  adoption  of  existing  facilities  to  new  environmental 
requirements, provided the assistance is limited to 20% of the cost of adaption
23 
Table 2:  WTO Rules as they Apply to Subsides and Countervailing Measures 
Agriculture 
Prohibited Subsidies: 
- Export Subsidies on Products not Identified in the Countries Schedule of Commitments 
Actionable Subsidies: 
- Ad Valorem Product Specific Support Exceeds 5% 
- Ad Valorem Product Specific Support 1  %_5%25 
- Ad Valorem Non-Specifid6 Support Exceeds 1  %24 
- Direct Payments under Production Limiting Programs24 
- Export Subsidies on Products Specified in the Countries Schedule of Commitments24 
Non-Actionable Subsidies: 
- Generally Available Subsidies 
- Ad Valorem Subsidization Less than 1  % 
- General Services: 
- research 
- pest and disease control 
25  With a determination of injury and "due restraint" must be shown in bringing a case. 
26  The term non-specific is used in the context of Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 49 
- training services 
- extension and advisory services 
- inspection services 
- marketing and promotion services 
- infrastructure 
- Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes 
- Domestic Food Aid 
- Direct Payments to Producers through Decoupled Income Support 
- Government Financial Participation in income insurance and income safety-net programs 
- Payments for Relief from Natural Disasters 
- Structural Adjustment Assistance Provided through: 
- producer retirement programs 
- resource retirement programs 
- investment aids 
- Payments Under Environmental Programs 
- Payments Under Regional Assistance Programs 
- Specific Subsidies which Meet the Following Conditions: 
assistance for research activities if the assistance covers not more than 75% of the 
costs of industrial research or 50% of the costs of pre-competitive development 
activity 
assistance to disadvantaged regions, based on specified development criteria 
assistance  to  promote  adoption  of  existing  facilities  to  new  environmental 
requirements, provided the assistance is limited to 20% of the cost of adaption. February 9, 1996 
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